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It is odd that an empiricist such as myself would be asked to lead off a
conference by writing and talking about conceptualizations of diversity. On
second thought, it's not so odd: Facts often get in the way of beautiful concepts
and theories.
I find most conceptualizations of diversity so empirically implausible that I
can't tell whether those who advocate them really believe them. When I
presented some of my work at Harvard in 1996, Professor Randall Kennedy
suggested that I was taking claims about diversity too seriously. Kennedy
provocatively argued, "No one really believes in diversity."' In his view at the
time, people asserted a rationale they didn't believe because, after Bakke,2
diversity was all that was left to support affirmative action. As Kennedy
commented to me, the Supreme Court closed the door (affirmative action) but
left open a window (diversity).
Among the many strengths of Professor Peter Schuck's Diversity in
America is that it explores these definitional problems: What does diversity
mean, and does it make sense? Schuck defines diversity as "those differences in
values, attitudes, or activities among individuals or groups that a particular
society deems salient to the social status or behavior of those individuals or
groups."
3
On the wisdom of pushing for diversity, Schuck and I differ: To the extent
that diversity in practice is used to promote affirmative action, I favor it as a
social policy; with some exceptions, Schuck reluctantly opposes it. But we
agree much of the time about the factual problems with most pro-diversity
arguments and the hardships that unintended consequences can bring to some
diversity programs.
In promoting affirmative action, I tend to favor a combination of
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1. Professor Randall Kennedy was the commentator for my talk, Measuring Diversity, in the fall of
1996. I originally recorded the quoted statement in notes. It may or may not represent Kennedy's current
thinking.
2. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 7
(2003).
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characteristics and a rationale mostly disfavored by the courts. In my view, the
sort of diversity that law schools should promote is a better representation of
groups that were both historically locked out in profound ways and are still
substantially underrepresented in academics.
In other words, one must squarely face the need for greater ethnic
advancement as a corrective for past cultural deprivation and racism. While the
original idea of affirmative action was in some senses paternalistic-it is
something that those in control of institutions do for those weakened by
discrimination-diversity, on the other hand, is not supposed to be based on
weakness. Rather, each important cleavage is a source of diversity and thus a
source of strength. Nor is any group necessarily disadvantaged or advantaged
by diversity. All important groups should be well represented, whether they are
minorities or majorities.
This seeming neutrality of diversity is often illusory because the last thing
that many who favor diversity in law school faculties want is a strong effort to
make faculty viewpoints more closely resemble the distribution of political and
social opinion in the country. Yet this social engineering rationale carries with
it a responsibility-to care about outcomes so that one should not push
diversity or affirmative action where it would harm those it is most intended to
benefit. In short, I am arguing that the scope of affirmative action should be
limited by what works, not by what makes social engineers feel good.
If someone asks me what diversity is, my usual reply is: "Why do you want
to know? To what use do you plan to put the definition?"
One can best understand what diversity means or what sorts of diversity are
supposed to count if one reads over the diversity statements of various
4 56universities, such as Yale, Harvard,  and Princeton. In these statements, the
4. Yale's Graduate School Statement states:
The Office for Diversity and Equal Opportunity is committed to building a supportive
graduate school community whereby students of color, women and other underrepresented
students are actively recruited to the graduate school and encouraged in their professional,
social and intellectual goals and pursuits. The Office for Diversity and Equal Opportunity was
established with the premise that expanding the diversity within the student body enhances the
intellectual experience and understanding of the entire scholarly community. The Office
operates collaboratively with departments and programs to proactively recruit and support the
needs of underrepresented students as they pursue graduate study at Yale. The Office is under
the administrative direction of Assistant Dean Liza Cariaga-Lo, who works with students,
faculty and administrators within the Graduate School and the University to carry out the
mission of the Office. In addition, a full-time administrative assistant and Graduate Fellows
help develop and implement recruitment and retention programs. An Advisory Committee,
appointed by the Dean, meets regularly to offer additional support and vision for the Office's
programmatic efforts. The Office provides support at many levels to students of color and
women as they prepare for, begin and complete the graduate education process at Yale.
Students are encouraged to visit the Office to find out more about programs sponsored by the
Office.
Yale Univ. Graduate Sch. of Arts and Scis., Office of Diversity & Equal Opportunity (ODEO), at
http://www.yale.edu/graduateschool/diversity/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
5. Harvard University's Statement on Diversity, by Harvard President Lawrence H. Summers,
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primary rationale for pursuing racial and ethnic diversity offered by universities
is that such a policy will promote viewpoint diversity. Harvard's statement
asserts: "Diversity contributes to educational excellence by enabling
outstanding students, faculty, and staff of all backgrounds to come together and
learn from one another." 7 After mentioning recruiting and encouraging
"students of color, women and other underrepresented students," Yale's
Graduate School states: "The Office for Diversity and Equal Opportunity was
established with the premise that expanding the diversity within the student
body enhances the intellectual experience and understanding of the entire
scholarly community."
8
Princeton's more extensive statement makes similar arguments:
reads:
A number of questions have been asked in recent days about the University's position and my
own views on diversity. I thought a brief statement might be helpful in this regard.
I take pride in Harvard's longstanding commitment to diversity. I believe it is essential for us
to maintain that commitment, working to create an ever more open and inclusive environment
that draws on the widest possible range of talents. Our approach to admissions, cited as a
model in the nation's highest court, advances our compelling interest in racial and other forms
of diversity. Diversity contributes to educational excellence by enabling outstanding students,
faculty, and staff of all backgrounds to come together and learn from one another. I look
forward to working with colleagues at Harvard and elsewhere to promote ever greater
opportunity for all.
With regard to the Afro-American Studies program at Harvard, we are proud of this program
collectively and of each of its individual members. We would very much like to see the
current faculty stay at Harvard and will compete vigorously to make this an attractive
environment.
Lawrence H. Summers, Statement on Diversity at Harvard University, at
http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2002/diversity.html (Jan. 2, 2002).
6. Princeton's Statement on Diversity and Community reads:
In May of 1994 Princeton approved the following statement of our goals and aspiration in the
important areas of diversity and community.
Princeton University is a community devoted to learning. We actively seek students, faculty,
and staff of exceptional ability and promise who share in our commitment to excellence in
teaching and scholarship, and who will bring a diversity of viewpoints and cultures. By
incorporating a broad range of human experiences and a rich variety of human perspectives,
we enlarge our capacity for learning, enrich the quality and texture of campus life, and better
prepare for life and leadership in a pluralistic society.
As a community, we respect the dignity, individuality, and freedom of each member. At the
same time, we strive to be a place where individuals and groups learn with and from each
other. We aim to foster a sense of shared experience and common purpose, along with a
collective responsibility for each other's well-being and for the well-being of the university as
a whole.
Although we acknowledge the difficulties inherent in creating a community of individuals
who are different from each other, we remain unwavering in our commitment to both diversity
and community in a context of academic excellence. We seek to enable all members of this
community to pursue their educational, scholarly, and career interests in an environment that
recognizes both the distinctiveness of each person's experience and the common humanity that
unites us all, and permits us to take full educational advantage of the variety of talents,
backgrounds, and perspectives of those who live and work here.
Princeton Univ. Office of Human Res., Statement on Diversity and Community, at
http://www.princeton.edu/hr/handbook/divers.htm (last modified June 20, 2001).
7. Summers, supra note 5.
8. Yale Univ. Graduate Sch. of Arts and Scis., supra note 4.
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We actively seek students, faculty, and staff of exceptional ability and promise who
share in our commitment to excellence in teaching and scholarship, and who will
bring a diversity of viewpoints and cultures. By incorporating a broad range of
human experiences and a rich variety of human perspectives, we enlarge our
capacity for learning, enrich the quality and texture of campus life, and better
prepare for life and leadership in a pluralistic society.
We seek to enable all members of this community to pursue their educational,
scholarly, and career interests in an environment that recognizes both the
distinctiveness of each person's experience and the common humanity that unites us
all, and permits us to take full educational advantage of the variety of talents,
backgrounds, and perspectives of those who live and work here.
9
Many people, including the university officials who composed these
statements, seem to be operating on the assumption that the groups that have
been discriminated against historically are the same groups that are under-
represented in universities and further that these two presumptively coextensive
sets of groups are coextensive with the groups that would provide more
viewpoint diversity if their numbers were increased in academia. Anyone who
thinks about this set of propositions should realize that they are highly unlikely,
at least on the faculty side.
Which groups would provide the most viewpoint diversity if added to the
typical law faculty? On most law faculties, the groups that would provide the
most viewpoint diversity would be Republicans, conservatives, and evangelical
or fundamentalist Christians-none among the groups that were traditionally
locked out by the United States' racist and sexist practices of discrimination.
Which groups are the most over-represented in law teaching? Mostly
Jewish and atheist law professors and members of the Democratic Party, yet
Jews were discriminated against in the United States and were subject to hate
crimes, and still are. Anti-Jewish sentiment, moreover, may have been getting
worse in the last few years, especially among students, the young, and street
demonstrators.' 0 Yet Jews are overrepresented in law teaching by a ratio of
about thirteen to one,1 compared to the full-time working population.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Anti-Israel Activity on American College Campuses, at
http://www.adl.org/Israel/campusantiisrael/default.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
11. See James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity (Nov. 7, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (documenting that, in the mid-1990s, Jews constituted about twenty-seven percent of law
professors, but only about two percent of the full-time working population). Religion and party
identification were determined in a 1993-94 survey of 710 law professors at the top one-hundred law
schools (sixty-six percent response rate), weighted by race and gender figures from the 1996-97
American Association of Law Schools database for those one-hundred schools. Religion and party
identification in the general and full-time working public were determined using data in the National
Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey [hereinafter GSS] (1988-94 for non-Hispanic whites,
1982-94 for minorities, and 1972-94 for lawyers), weighted by race and gender for those aged thirty to
seventy-five in the U.S. Census Bureau's 1994 Current Population Survey (which adjusted for
undercounts of minorities in the 1990 Census). The GSS data are available at Nat'l Opinion Research
Ctr., General Social Survey, at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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Similarly, Asian-American students are over-represented on many college
campuses compared to their numbers in the general population, yet Asian
Americans were discriminated against and still are in some areas.
Now consider one of the demographic groups that I belong to-atheists-
who are substantially over-represented on law faculties (twenty-six percent in
law teaching in the mid-1990s compared to about eight percent in the full-time
working population at that time). 12 Yet in the 1991 General Social Survey
(GSS), only forty percent of respondents disagreed with the statement
"Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office." Among
respondents, twenty-nine percent agreed that atheists were unfit for office,




For comparison, in the same year (1991) GSS respondents were also asked:
"If your party nominated a woman for President, would you vote for her if she
were qualified for the job?" In response, eighty-seven percent said they would
vote for a woman, eight percent said no, and five percent didn't know or
declined to answer. 15 When asked the same question about their willingness to
vote for an African American, an almost identical pattern resulted: eighty-seven
percent said they would vote for an African American, nine percent said no,
and four percent didn't know or declined to answer.1 6 These data suggest that
the general public is much more willing to bar atheists from public life than
African Americans or women, yet atheists are very substantially over-
represented in law teaching, not under-represented.
Now consider which are the most under-represented groups in law
teaching? The most under-represented large racial, gender, political, or
religious groups are Republicans and Hispanics, whose shares of law faculties
in the mid-1990s were less than a third of their shares in the full-time working
population. 17 If you break down these groups into subgroups, then white female
Republicans are almost nonexistent in law teaching,' 8 while they are among the
largest subgroups when breaking down the general U.S. population by race,
gender, and party. Rather than being favored in law school hiring as an under-
represented group, white female Republicans are sometimes opposed by those
12. Lindgren, supra note 11.
13. 1 analyzed the 1991 GSS, supra note 11 (variable POLSGOD), weighting by adults in
household, divided by mean adults in household (1972-2002), divided by a design effect of 1.5.
14. In academics, it may be that evangelical Christians, rather than atheists, are discriminated
against.
15. GSS, supra note 13 (variable FEPRES).
16. Id. (variable RACPRES).
17. See Lindgren, supra note II (demonstrating that, in law teaching, Hispanics were at about
thirty-one percent of parity with the full-time working population and Republicans were at about thirty-
two percent of parity).
18. See id. (noting that, in the mid-1990s, white female Republicans made up about 0.3% of law
professors compared to about 13.5% of the full-time working population).
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arguing for diversity because the academic stereotype of a woman is someone
left of center-and these women don't fit the stereotype. Yet in the mid-1990s
all of the substantial under-representation of white women on law faculties
compared to the full-time working population was among white Republican
women. 19 White Democratic women were over-represented on law faculties
compared to the full-time working population of a similar age and the pool of
lawyers aged thirty to seventy-five.
20
Another thing to recognize is a pluralism of overlapping categories. When I
looked at this in the mid-1990s, I discovered that we law professors were all
members of both under-represented and over-represented groups in some
nontrivial way. As an atheist, I was over-represented in law teaching compared
to almost any relevant population. As a white male, I was over-represented in
law teaching compared to the full-time working population, but under-
represented in law teaching compared to lawyers aged thirty to seventy-five. To
take another example, an African American Democratic female would be very
substantially over-represented in law teaching compared to lawyers aged thirty
to seventy-five and over-represented as a Democrat compared to both lawyers
and the working population, but would be under-represented in law teaching as
21
an African American and as a female compared to the working population.
Does this mean that all these pluralist categories magically cancel out and
that there is no reason for concern? Absolutely not. My point is not that
diversity doesn't matter or that all kinds of diversity are the same, but rather
that being under-represented or over-represented is not something that one
person possesses or doesn't possess-each individual is both over-represented
and under-represented at the same time. To sort out the relevance of these
diversity claims, one must engage in careful analysis and justification,
considering what the goal and the relevant metric might be. If it's viewpoint
diversity that counts most (as most university diversity statements assume),
then of the dimensions that I have studied, political diversity is the cleavage
that divides Americans the most, followed by race. This pattern holds, not only
for a range of political issues, but also for a range of legal issues as well (e.g.,
22abortion rights, gun control, pornography prohibition). Less important for
viewpoint diversity are age, education, occupational prestige, and gender.
23
Although bringing different viewpoints to bear is the main rationale for




22. If one moves to lifestyle issues (such as happiness, trust, or television watching), education
becomes more important. James Lindgren, What Groups Think (Aug. 1, 2001) (unpublished manuscript,




O'Connor (writing for the majority) bases her support for the University of
Michigan's admissions program first on viewpoint diversity: "[T]he skills
needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."
24
Along the same lines, O'Connor approvingly quotes the district court:
"'[C]lassroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting' when the students have 'the greatest possible
variety of backgrounds."'
25
O'Connor then develops a different argument that speaks more of remedial
affirmative action than of diversity:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions
that provide this training. As we have recognized, law schools "cannot be effective
in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts."
Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of
our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions that
provide the training and education necessary to succeed in America.26
I like this argument better because it recognizes the special salience of race
and does not hide behind the seemingly neutral blind of viewpoint diversity,
though obviously it comes close to adopting the remedial argument that the
court has usually rejected as a ground for affirmative action: Without
particularized proof of discrimination against the plaintiffs, which is lacking in
the typical case, remedying past societal discrimination is usually irrelevant.
What about religion and politics? Is it also "necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every"
religion and political orientation, or is it just "race and ethnicity" that counts? If
the former, then elite universities are failing miserably in developing and
nurturing Republicans, conservatives, and evangelical Christians, particularly
as faculty members.
But if not all sorts of diversity are the same-and they are not-then we
must brush aside the platitudes about viewpoint diversity and face the remedial
issue squarely. Race and gender are different in part because women and
African Americans were formerly largely excluded from faculty positions by
elite universities and professions in this country, while Republicans and most
denominations of Christians were not. It is precisely because of this history of
discrimination that society needs to be concerned about "the path to
24. 539 U.S. 306, 321 (2003).
25. Id. at 333.
26. Id. at 332 (citation omitted).
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leadership."
27
Yet if we are genuinely concerned about what leads women and minorities
to succeed in society, then we must address the empirical questions inherent in
this conceptualization of diversity as well. Both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in Grutter pointed to some well-conducted empirical studies, some
suggesting that affirmative action was working well to promote achievement by
women and historically disadvantaged minorities, some suggesting that it was
not. The state of the social science research is far from converging at this early
stage.
Even those of us who favor affirmative action must be open to research
suggesting what works and what does not. Does affirmative action actually help
open up positions of influence in society, as works by Professor Richard
Lempert2 8 and Professors William Bowen and Derek Bok29 seem to suggest?
Or does affirmative action prevent too many African Americans from
succeeding at the schools they attend, as new work by Professor Richard
Sander suggests? 30 Or are both assertions substantially true? What about the
"critical mass" argument? Many minority students want to attend schools
where there are more (rather than fewer) students of the same ethnicity. But do
minorities actually do better as a result of being around more students of the
same ethnicity, either in school or after graduation? And what effect on the
exchange of ideas results from having a typical affirmative-action program
compared to a very aggressive one?
These are empirical questions whose results will vary by time and place and
yet their answers should be studied in the field to try to ascertain how to tweak
the policies that we have adopted. Once we commit ourselves to a major
program of social engineering, it is important to know what our engineering is
producing.
My primary purpose in this Essay is to suggest that the groups that would
provide the most viewpoint diversity in academics (particularly on faculties)
are not the same as the groups that have been discriminated against or the
groups that are most under-represented. When we talk of diversity in the
future-and we will-we should recognize that affirmative action is not the
same as diversity. Promoting intellectual diversity would often point away from
hiring more minorities and toward hiring more Republicans or evangelical
Christians. Conversely, promoting further ethnic and gender diversity,
27. Id.
28. See Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs
Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395 (2000).
29. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1999).
30. See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2004).
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particularly in faculty hiring, often would not foster a wider range of
intellectual or political views--or more representative ones. Indeed, if most of
the women and ethnic minorities who are actually hired on law faculties tend to
lean toward the Democratic Party, the faculty overall may become less
representative of the diversity of views in the wider public. Without clear
thinking, promoting "diversity" can unintentionally produce less intellectual
diversity rather than more.
As Peter Schuck observes in Diversity in America:
Our public and private institutions adopt preferences for certain forms of diversity
(e.g., skin color, surname, and athleticism) while ignoring or even discouraging
other diversities that are-or in my view ought to be-more closely linked to these
institutions' goals. Faculties that should thrive on viewpoint diversity seem to have
little taste for it .... 31
Indeed.
31. SCHUCK, supra note 3, at 316.
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